De Novo Review of ERISA Plan Administrators\u27 Factual Determinations by Hewett, Gregory A.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 71 Issue 1 
January 1993 
De Novo Review of ERISA Plan Administrators' Factual 
Determinations 
Gregory A. Hewett 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Insurance Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law 
Commons, and the Retirement Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gregory A. Hewett, De Novo Review of ERISA Plan Administrators' Factual Determinations, 71 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 165 (1993). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss1/5 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
DE Novo REVIEW OF ERISA PLAN ADMINISTRATORS' FACTUAL
DETERMINATIONS
Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d
1176 (3d Cir. 1991)
In Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds,1 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit concluded that dis-
trict courts should review de novo a plan administrator's decision to deny
benefits based solely on factual determinations when the plan does not
grant the administrator discretion to make factual determinations.2
After Francis Luby's death, the Teamsters Health and Welfare Fund
of Philadelphia and Vicinity ("the Fund") paid his death benefit to his
girlfriend, Patricia Golosky.a Luby's estranged wife, Diane Luby, filed
suit in Pennsylvania state court against Golosky, the Fund, and its ad-
ministrator alleging wrongful denial of death benefits.4 The Fund re-
moved the case to federal district court under section 502(a)(1)(B) of the
1. 944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991).
2. Id. at 1183. The Third Circuit agreed with the district court's conclusion that the plan did
not grant the administrator discretionary authority to resolve factual disputes. Id. at 1181. See
infra note 16.
The scope of this Case Comment is limited to the question of the appropriate standard of review
for actions brought under § 502(aX1)(B) of ERISA (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988)).
For a broader discussion of current developments in employee benefits' case law, see Roger C. Siske
& Joni L. Andrioff, What's New in Deferred Compensation A Summary of Current Case and Other
Developments, in PENSION, PROFIT SHARING, AND OTHER DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS 1
(ALI-ABA Course Study Materials, 1992).
3. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1179. Patricia Golosky lived with Francis Luby for eleven years, until
just before his death. Id.
As a participant in the Fund, the plan entitled Luby to designate a beneficiary for a $20,000 lump
sum death benefit. Under the terms of the plan, the death benefit was payable by the Fund to the
person named on a beneficiary card. Id. When Francis Luby died, two beneficiary cards were on file
with the Fund. The first card, filed in 1968, designated Diane Luby as beneficiary. The second card,
filed in 1987, designated Golosky. Id. Fund policy required the administrator to pay benefits to the
beneficiary on the most recent valid card. Furthermore, the Fund guidelines required that a benefici-
ary apply to the Fund for the death benefits. Id. The Fund paid the death benefit to Golosky. Id.
Diane Luby filed a claim for the death benefit shortly after Luby died. Golosky had not filed a claim
when the Fund paid the death benefit to her. Id.
4. Francis and Diane Luby separated in 1974, but never divorced. Id. Diane Luby alleged
that the second beneficiary card was not valid because Francis Luby never signed the card. Id.
Golosky admitted that she had signed Luby's name to the card, but asserted that she had power of
attorney to do so. Id. at 1179 n.1.
ERISA allows concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction for civil actions only if brought
under § 502(aX1)(B). Otherwise, federal courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(e)(1) (1988).
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA").s Reviewing de
novo the administrator's decision, the district court awarded the death
benefit to Diane Luby.6 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision and held that a district court may exercise de novo
review of an ERISA plan administrator's denial of benefits when the ad-
ministrator based the denial only on factual determinations.'
Congress enacted ERISA8 to promote the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries in pension benefits following retirement.9 Section
5. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1179. Section 502(a) provides that "[a] civil action may be brought (1)
by a participant or beneficiary... (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988) ("[A]ny
civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.").
The Fund and the administrator cross-claimed against Golosky for restitution if Luby prevailed.
Luby, 944 F.2d at 1179. Golosky then cross-claimed against the Fund alleging that if Luby pre-
vailed, Golosky was entitled to damages because the Fund negligently provided Francis Luby with
ambiguous and improper beneficiary designation forms. Id.
6. The district court compared the signatures on the two beneficiary cards with authenticated
signatures of Francis Luby on other documents. Based on this comparison, the district court found
that the 1968 card was valid, and that the 1987 card was invalid because Francis Luby never signed
it. Id. at 1184.
In addressing the validity of the cards, the district court weighed evidence (the authenticated
signatures) that the administrator never had opportunity to consider. The Third Circuit held that a
district court exercising de novo review is not limited to the evidence that the administrator consid-
ered. Id. at 1184-85. See Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86, 89 (11th Cir.
1989); Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane). But see Miller v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 986 (6th Cir. 1991); Perry v. Simplicity Eng'g, 900 F.2d
963, 966 (6th Cir. 1990); McMahan v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 88 F.2d 426, 431 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1989). The district court also found that the Fund was entitled to restitution from Golosky and
that Golosky's cross-claim against the Fund lacked merit. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1179.
7. The Third Circuit first held that the plan neither expressly nor impliedly granted the ad-
ministrator discretion to decide between beneficiary claimants. Id. at 1180-81.
8. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). This section provides in pertinent part:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans
in recent years has been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and economic
impact of such plans is increasingly interstate; that the continued well-being and security of
millions of employees and their dependents are directly affected by these plans; that they
are affected with a national public interest ... that owing to the lack of employee informa-
tion and adequate safeguards concerning their operation, it is desirable in the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare and the free flow
of commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the estab-
lishment, operation, and administration of such plans ... that despite the enormous
growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment are losing antici-
pated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans; that owing
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502(a) of ERISA, allows plan participants and their beneficiaries to chal-
lenge the benefit determinations of plan authorities by filing a civil suit to
recover benefits, enforce their rights under the terms of the plan, and
clarify their rights to future benefits under the plan."° Most plans dele-
gate the responsibility of making benefit determinations to the plan "ad-
ministrator." 1' Yet, Congress did not specify a standard of review for
district courts to apply when reviewing a plan administrator's benefit de-
terminations.12 Consequently, federal courts formulated an "arbitrary
and capricious" standard for reviewing ERISA cases. 3
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,'4 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the standard of review for an ERISA administrator's resolution
of a benefit dispute.' 5 The Court held that a district court should exer-
to the inadequacy of current minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with
respect to adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the
termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their
beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits; and that it is therefore desirable in
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of the
United States, and to provide for the free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be
provided assuring the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.
29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988). See supra note 5. See also Michael S. Beaver, The Stan-
dard ofReview in ERISA Benefits Denial Cases After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Revolu-
tion of Deja Vu?, 26 TORT & INs. L.J. 1, 2 (1990).
11. Beaver, supra note 10, at 2. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) (1988) which provides that:
The term "administrator" means-
(i) The person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under which
the plan is operated;
(ii) if an administrator is not so designated, the plan sponsor; or
(iii) in the case of a plan for which an administrator is not designated and a plan spon-
sor cannot be identified, such other person as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.
12. Beaver, supra note 10, at 2.
13. Id. Federal courts adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard developed under 29
U.S.C. § 1867(c) (1988), a provision of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989). The LMRA first provided for joint manage-
ment-labor employee benefits trusts. Beaver, supra note 10, at 2. Federal courts adopted the
LMRA's arbitrary and capricious standard for ERISA by analogy. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1)
(1988) (federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all ERISA actions, except civil actions under
§ 1 132(a)(1)(B)); see also supra note 4. The arbitrary and capricious standard was developed under
the LMRA largely as a means of asserting jurisdiction over suits under § 186(e) of the LMRA by
plan beneficiaries who were denied benefits by trustees. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109. Unlike the
LMRA, ERISA explicitly authorizes civil suits in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). Id. at 110. See also Beaver,
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
15. Id. In 1980, the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company sold its Plastics Division to Occidental
Petroleum Company. Occidental rehired most of the Firestone employees in their same jobs and at
their same rates of pay without interruption. Firestone's "termination pay plan" provided: "If your
service is discontinued prior to the time you are eligible for pension benefits, you will be given termi-
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cise de novo review of a denial of benefits challenged under section
1132(a)(1)(B) unless the benefit plan provides the administrator with dis-
cretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan. 6 The Court rejected the arbitrary and capricious
standard adopted by the lower courts.17  Instead, the Court followed
trust law principles,' 8 which apply a deferential standard of review only
when a trustee exercises discretionary powers. 19 Therefore, unless a ben-
efit plan grants discretion to the plan administrator, a court will review
the administrator's benefit determinations de novo.' °
Yet, the scope of the Court's holding in Firestone is ambiguous. The
nation pay if released because of a reduction in work force ...." Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added). Six
former Firestone employees who were rehired by Occidental claimed severance benefits under Fire-
stone's termination pay plan. Id. at 105. Firestone, the administrator of the plan, denied the bene-
fits, contending that the sale of the division did not constitute a "reduction in work force" within the
scope of the plan. Id. at 106.
The employees filed a class action on behalf of "former, salaried, non-union employees" of the
Firestone Plastics Division. The employees based their suit on ERISA § 502(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1). Id at 106. See supra note 5. The district court granted summary judgment for Fire-
stone, holding that Firestone's determination that the sale of the division did not constitute a "reduc-
tion in work force" was not arbitrary or capricious. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 106-07. The Third
Circuit reversed, holding that when the employer is the administrator of an unfunded benefit plan, a
district court should review a decision to deny benefits de novo. Id. at 107.
16. Id. at 115.
17. Id. at 108-10. Noting that the "raison d'etre" for the arbitrary and capricious standard in
LMRA cases is a need for a jurisdictional basis in suits against trustees, see supra note 13, the Court
asserted that LMRA principles offered no support because ERISA expressly provides for jurisdiction
of suits against plan administrators. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109-110.
18. Id at 110. "ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law." Id.
ERISA's legislative history indicates an intent to subject ERISA fiduciaries to principles of trust law.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1973)).
19. 489 U.S. at 111. The Court cited the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
The Restatement provides that "[w]here discretion is conferred upon the trustee with respect to the
exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse by
the trustee of his discretion."
20. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115. The Court rejected Firestone's several arguments for adopting
the arbitrary and capricious standard. First, Firestone argued that the interpretation of the terms of
a plan is an inherently discretionary function. However, the Court concluded that trust principles
required district courts to interpret plan terms "in light of all the circumstances" without deferring
to either party. Id. at 112 (citing REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTS § 4 cmt. d (1959)). In
addition, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review would afford less protection to employees
and their beneficiaries than the protection that existed before Congress enacted ERISA. This is
contrary to ERISA's purpose "to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in em-
ployee benefit plans." Id. at 113-14 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)). Fur-
thermore, the Court rejected as inconclusive Firestone's argument that de novo review would
increase litigation and administrative costs and thereby discourage employers from creating benefit
plans. Id. at 114-15.
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court did not specify whether de novo review applies to all determina-
tions by the plan administrator, or just those regarding interpretation of
the plans terms.21 The Court's trust rationale suggests that district
courts should broadly apply de novo review.22 Although the Court spe-
cifically stated that its holding applied to benefit denials based upon eligi-
bility determinations, the language of the opinion did not limit the
holding to such benefit denials founded upon plan interpretations and
subsequently challenged under section 1132(a)(1)(B).23
The Court's opinion also contained language which restricted the
holding in other respects. First, the Court initially limited the scope of
its discussion to addressing the appropriate standard of review in section
1132(a)(1)(B) actions challenging denials of benefits based on plan inter-
pretations.24 Second, the Court emphasized that the decision did not
concern the appropriate standard of review for actions under other reme-
dial provisions of ERISA.25 Finally, the Court observed that the validity
of many benefit claims depends upon the interpretation of plan terms.26
The Court's ambiguity has led various appellate courts to develop differ-
ent standards of review for factual determinations by plan
administrators. 27
21. In Luby, for example, the administrator determined that Golosky was the proper benefici-
ary based solely on the facts rather than on an interpretation of the plan terms involved. Luby, 944
F.2d at 1179. See also Beaver, supra note 10, at 19.
22. See Beaver, supra note 10, at 19 (nothing in the body of general trust law differentiates
administrator's decisions of fact from those of plan interpretations).
23. The Court provided that:
Consistent with established principles of trust law, we hold that a denial of benefits chal-
lenged under § 1132(aX)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit
plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.
Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
24. Id. at 108. The facts of Firestone involved only an interpretation of plan terms. The liti-
gants did not dispute the facts of the case. Id. at 106.
25. Id.
26. "As this case aptly demonstrates, the validity of a claim to benefits under an ERISA plan is
likely to turn on the interpretation of terms in the plan of issue." Id. at 115.
27. See Reinking v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990) (de novo
review); Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991)
(same); Petrilli v. Drechsel, 910 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1990) (dictum) (same). But see Pierre v. Con-
necticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir.) (abuse of discretion review), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 453 (1991).
In Petrilli v. Drechsel, 910 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1990), the Seventh Circuit considered in dictum
the scope of Firestone's holding. In Petrih, the denial of benefits turned upon a plan interpretation.
Id. at 1446. Yet, the Seventh Circuit outlined two possible interpretations of Firestone. The narrow
reading focused on the phrase appearing early in the Firestone opinion which limited a court's dis-
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In Reinking v. Philadelphia American Life Insurance Co. 28 the Fourth
Circuit held that a district court could properly exercise de novo review
of an administrator's factual determinations.29 The court held that de
novo review applied both to interpretations of plan terms and to factual
determinations necessary to determine benefit eligibility.30 The court
reasoned that deferring to the plan administrator's decision when the
plan did not grant the administrator discretionary authority would un-
necessarily undermine the protection afforded the employee by ERISA.3"
In Pierre v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. ,32 the Fifth Circuit
held that a district court should apply an "abuse of discretion" standard
cretion to "actions challenging denials of benefits based on plan interpretations." Id. (citing Fire-
stone, 489 U.S. at 108). See also supra note 24 and accompanying text. The court asserted that
under this reading, the holding and the limitation together mandate de novo review of only certain
benefit denials-denials based upon plan interpretations by administrators who lack discretionary
authority to construe plan terms. Thus, de novo review is not proper if the denial of benefits is based
on any factor other than an interpretation of plan terms. Petrilli, 910 F.2d at 1446.
The Seventh Circuit also considered a broader reading of Firestone. Despite the earlier limiting
language, Firestone's holding provided for de novo review "unless the benefit plan gives the adminis-
trator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
terms of the plan." Id. (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115). See supra note 23 and accompanying
text. This broader interpretation followed from the absence of certain limiting language. The Sev-
enth Circuit contended that if the plan did not confer discretion upon the administrator, the
Supreme Court's holding mandates de novo review of the denial of benefits regardless of whether the
administrator based the denial of benefits upon plan interpretations. Petrilli, 910 F.2d at 1446.
Otherwise, the court asserted that the Supreme Court could have omitted the phrase "to determine
eligibility for benefits" from the "unless" clause. The omission would have restricted the "unless"
clause to "unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to
construe the terms of the plan." The Seventh Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court's inclusion
of the phrase "to determine eligibility for benefits" implied a broader applicability of de novo review.
Id.
The Seventh Circuit further found support for this broader reading in the Supreme Court's anal-
ogy to trust law. The Court's rationale in Firestone focused on whether the plan granted the admin-
istrator discretionary authority, not whether the decision was interpretive or factual. Id. See also
Foster McGaw Hosp. v. Building Material Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Welfare Fund, 925
F.2d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1991) (leaving open the issue of standard of review for factual
determinations).
28. 910 F.2d 1210 (4th Cir. 1990).
29. In Reinking, the plaintiff, suffering major depression, attempted to commit suicide by re-
peatedly stabbing herself with a knife. Id. at 1212. The plan administrator denied her request for
medical benefits because the policy excluded coverage for "intentionally self-inflicted injuries." Id.
The dispute arose because the plaintiff contended that she could not have "intentionally" wounded
herself because of her mental condition. Id.
30. Id. at 1213-14.
31. Id. at 1214. See also DeNobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1184-86 (4th Cir. 1989) (more
detailed discussion of Firestone by Fourth Circuit; applying abuse of discretion standard because
administrator granted discretionary power).
32. 932 F.2d 1552 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 453 (1991).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss1/5
1993] DE NOVO REVIEW OF ERISA FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS 171
of review when reviewing a plan administrator's factual determina-
tions.33 The court emphasized that a plan administrator must make two
separate determinations before deciding benefit eligibility.34 First, the
plan administrator must determine the facts underlying the benefit
claim.35  Second, the plan administrator must decide whether those un-
derlying facts constitute a claim payable under the plan's terms.3 6 The
court found that Firestone only mandated de novo review for the plan
administrator's second determination.37 Consequently, the court applied
an "abuse of discretion" standard of review to the plan administrator's
factual determinations. 38
The Fifth Circuit noted that courts generally review factual determina-
tions under a deferential standard. 39  Because the ERISA plan adminis-
trator acted as the trier of fact, the court reasoned that a reviewing court
should defer to the administrator's factual determinations.' Next, the
court contended that the exercise of a de novo standard review would
increase litigation and decrease the efficiency of plan administration.41
33. In Pierre, the dispute concerned whether the deceased was killed by "accident." The de-
ceased's mistress shot him to death, and then claimed that she acted in self-defense. The deceased's
wife filed a claim for benefits under a group accident insurance policy. The plan administrator deter-
mined that his mistress acted in self-defense. Because the deceased's actions precipitated the fatal
shooting, the plan administrator determined that the death was not an "accident" within the mean-
ing of the policy and denied the benefits. Id. at 1560-62. For a more comprehensive discussion of
the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Pierre, see J. R. Cox, Recent Development, Pierre v. Connecticut
General Life Insurance Co- Piecing Together ERISA-Plan Administrator Fact-Finding Discretion
After Bruch, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1532 (1992).
34. Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1557.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1562. The Fifth Circuit, like the Supreme Court in Firestone, also considered princi-
ples of trust law. Id. at 1557. The court recognized that trustees can exercise implied discretionary
powers that are necessary or appropriate to fulfill express trust purposes. Id. at 1558 (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 186(b) (1959)) (trustees can properly exercise such powers as
are necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of the trust and are not forbidden by the terms
of the trust). The court also recognized that ERISA granted plan administrators some inherent
discretionary authority. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1988)) (granting plan administrators
"authority to control and manage the operation and administration of the plan"). The court con-
tended that plan administrators have inherent discretionary authority to make factual decisions that
determine eligibility for benefits because the decisions to pay benefits necessitate such authority in
order to administer the plan. Id.
39. The court stated that although deferring to an administrator's interpretation of plan terms
may result in the loss of pre-ERISA rights, such a loss does not occur when a court exercises defer-
ential review with respect to factual determinations. Id.
40. Id. at 1559.
41. Id. "The courts simply cannot supplant plan administrators, through de novo review, as
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Finally, the court concluded that Firestone did not apply to the facts at
issue in Pierre because, in Firestone, the Supreme Court did not define
the proper standard of review for factual determinations.42
In Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds,4" the
Third Circuit decided that a district court could properly exercise de
novo review of an administrator's factual determinations when the plan
did not grant the administrator discretion to make factual determina-
tions.' Initially, the court found that the plan in Luby did not expressly
or impliedly grant the administrator discretion to make factual determi-
nations. 45 The court recognized that the two possible readings of the
scope of Firestone's holding caused the split among the circuit courts."
The court stated that the Supreme Court's language not only failed to
limit the holding to interpretation of plan terms, but also expressly ap-
plied the holding to determinations of benefit eligibility.47 The court rea-
soned that a court should not construe the language of a Supreme Court
opinion as superfluous.4 8 Consequently, the court considered Firestone's
express reference to eligibility for benefits as indicative of the holding's
applicability to all eligibility determinations rather than merely those de-
terminations that plan administrators base upon interpretations of plan
terms.
4 9
The Third Circuit also considered the language in Firestone that lim-
ited the scope of the court's holding. The court reasoned that this lan-
guage"0 distinguished actions brought under section 1132(a)(1)(B) from
resolvers of mundane and routine fact disputes." Id. But see supra note 20 (discussing the Supreme
Court's rejection of a similar "expediency argument" in Firestone).
42. Pierre, 932 F.2d at 1561-62. See supra note 24.
43. 944 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1991).
44. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1183.
45. Id. at 1180-81. The court reasoned that a plan's grant of general administrative power
should not be construed as a general grant of discretionary power. Otherwise, courts would be
forced to exercise deferential review of plan interpretations, contrary to the mandate of Firestone.
Id.
46. Id. at 1182.
47. Id. at 1183. The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Petrilli. See supra note
27.
48. The Luby court noted that it "is a truism that language in the Supreme Court's opinions
should not readily be assumed to be superfluous, and ... the explicit reference to 'eligibility' in the
holding is more telling than the lack of any such reference in other passages." Luby, 944 F.2d at
1183 (quoting Barish v. United Mine Workers of America Health & Retirement Fund, 753 F. Supp.
165, 168-69 (W.D. Pa. 1990)).
49. Id.
50. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Specifically, the Firestone court stated:
"The discussion which follows is limited to the appropriate standard of review in § 1132(a)(l)(B)
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actions brought under ERISA's other remedial provisions."' Yet, the
court emphasized that the language did not distinguish section 1132(a)
(1)(B) actions challenging interpretations of plan terms from section
1132(a)(1)(B) actions contesting factual determinations.52
The Third Circuit also declined to extend the deference generally ac-
corded triers of fact to ERISA plan administrators. Unlike judges or
governmental agencies, ERISA plan administrators may lack the requi-
site education or training to prepare them to exercise administrative re-
sponsibilities.5 3 Finally, the court concluded that a de novo standard of
review furthers the policy underlying Firestone and ERISA: protecting
the interests that plan participants and their beneficiaries have in pension
benefits following retirement.5"
The Third Circuit persuasively concluded that de novo review consti-
tutes the appropriate standard of review for an ERISA plan administra-
tor's factual determinations. The court properly recognized that the
Firestone decision only defined the standard of review for actions brought
under section 1132(a)(1)(B).55 The court's analysis reflected the impor-
tance that the Supreme Court placed on both determining whether the
plan grants the administrator discretion and on recognizing ERISA's ob-
jective of protecting plan members and their beneficiaries. Consequently,
when reconciling the limiting language of Firestone with the broad scope
of the Supreme Court's holding,56 the Third Circuit correctly focused on
whether the plan granted the administrator discretionary authority,
rather than the basis on which the administrator denied the benefits.
The court in Luby provided a simple method for determining the ap-
plicable standard of review of an ERISA plan administrator's denial of
actions challenging denials of benefits based on plan interpretations. We express no view as to the
appropriate standard of review for actions under other remedial provisions of ERISA." Firestone,
489 U.S. at 108.
51. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1183.
52. Id. The court argued that reading the two sentences of the Court's limiting language in
conjunction, see Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108, downplayed the significance of the "based upon plan
interpretations" clause of the first sentence, and instead accentuated the "intended distinction be-
tween actions based on 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(1)(B) and those based on other ERISA provisions."
Luby, 944 F.2d at 1183.
53. Luby, 944 F.2d at 1183. The court suggested that the case adequately illustrated the need
for de novo review. The plan administrator's factual determination reflected little knowledge of
evidentiary rules or legal procedure. Id.
54. Id. at 1183-84. See supra notes 8, 20 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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benefits. First, a court should determine whether the litigant challenged
the denial of benefits under section 1132(a)(1)(B). If so, a court should
then determine whether the plan granted the administrator discretionary
authority. If the plan provided the administrator with such authority, a
court should exercise a deferential standard of review. If not, a court
should exercise de novo review.5 7 The court's suggested method not only
significantly reduces the confusion present in the federal common law5 8
concerning the appropriate standard of review for ERISA plan adminis-
trators' determinations, but also provides suitable guidelines for district
courts. As a result, the Third Circuit's holding in Luby promotes Con-
gress' goal in enacting ERISA: protecting the interests that plan mem-
bers and their beneficiaries have in pension benefits following
retirement.59
Gregory A. Hewett
57. See supra notes 16, 44-45 and accompanying text.
58. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 ("Given this language and history, we have held that courts
are to develop a 'federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.'"
(quoting Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)).
59. See supra note 9.
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